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Introduction 
The Kenyan political scientist and senator Peter Nyong’o observed in 2002, "Kenya 
seems to be going through a long transition from authoritarianism in a multi-party regime to 
some democratic form whose nature and contours are not yet clear"2. Eight years later, on 
August 4th, 2010, Kenyan citizens voted for a new Constitution, taking another step towards its 
final democratic form.  
Besides serving as a foundational legal document, the new Constitution seeks to reform 
Kenya in a multitude of ways, including how citizens participate in the political system. This 
paper seeks to find what impact Kenya’s new Constitution and its implementation had on citizen 
political participation since promulgation.  
It finds the Constitution and constitutional implementation positively affected citizen 
political participation in the first five years of implementation. The Constitution secured the 
citizens’ right of participation and made citizen political participation part of most governing 
institutions. Constitutional implementation improved citizens access to participation in three key 
areas: voting, elections, and responsive institutions.  
Constitutions and Citizen Political Participation in Kenya 
Constitutions in Kenya 
 The new Constitution’s reformative character and focus on citizen participation originates 
from Kenya’s turbulent history with constitutions and citizen political participation. Scholars, 
such as Barkan and Holmquist in 19893 and Throup in 19934, held Kenya up as an example of 
successful constitutional democratization in Africa. However, some scholars have since moved 
away from this view, finding serious failures within Kenya’s political system.  
One such scholar is P.L.O. Lumumba, the former Director of Kenya’s Anti-Corruption 
Commission. Prompted by the new Constitution’s promulgation, Lumumba traced Kenya’s 
constitutional history from independence to 2010. He attributes Kenya’s two previous 
constitutional failures to, in part, the dominance of the executive5. 
 Lumumba begins his narrative in 1963, with Kenya’s independence from Great Britain 
and the promulgation of the aptly named Independence Constitution6. Lumumba argues the 
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British colonial power mostly brought about the Independence Constitution as they exited 
Kenya, thus it had little legitimacy with the people or the political elite7. Within the first six 
years the new Kenyan government amended the Constitution ten times8. In 1969, another 
constitutional amendment merged these changes into one document, creating a new, revised 
Constitution9. 
For the most part, these amendments served to centralize power in the national 
government and into the hands of the executive10. For example, the Independence Constitution 
proposed a majimbo, regional, system of government, where political power would have been 
spread out across the country into sub-national units. The ruling party, KANU, thought this 
system “a conspiracy between the ethnic minorities and the colonial government” and, once in 
power after independence, amended the Constitution to centralize political power in the national 
government11.  
 According to Lumumba, the KANU’s centralization of power created an ‘Imperial 
Presidency’ holding absolute power and authority12. The constitutional amendments served to 
“ensure maximum control of political power, eradication of any check system and accountability 
mechanisms” for the executive13. Another amendment in 1966 did away with the Senate14, 
making the Parliament unicameral. In 1982, the KANU did away with multi-party politics 
altogether with another constitutional amendment, making Kenya into a one-party state15. This is 
the dominance of the executive mentioned earlier. 
This series of amendments show that Kenya’s first two constitutions failed, in part, 
because they were not the law of the land. Instead, the will of the political elites, more interested 
in their own power than a strong constitution, was the law of the land16.  
 In 1991, multi-party politics returned to Kenya with the 27th constitutional amendment17 
and with it calls for constitutional reform18. While the government made efforts towards 
reforming the Constitution, Lumumba argues the Post-Election Violence of 2007 and 2008 
(PEV)19 prompted the government to pass the Constitution of Kenya Review Act in 2008, which 
gave the legal framework for how Kenya would arrive at its new Constitution in 201020.  
Institutional Failure in Kenya 
There are many schools of thought on the PEV’s underlying causes. Two of them, 
however, speak to the constitutional failure that Lumumba focuses on. 
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The first is that ethnic tensions caused the PEV. Rozana Gutiérrez-Romero, for example, 
argues ethnicity and economic concerns were the main factors behind citizens’ voting decisions 
and what set off the violance. A voter’s ethnicity informed how they determined what they 
would gain from their ethnic politcal party winning21. Peter Nyong’o terms this ‘national cake 
politics’. Every election is a chance for each ethnic group to secure a bigger slice of the ‘national 
cake’, e.g. invesment, appointments, etc., for their ethnic group. People look at elected officals 
not as their political representative, but as the cakewiner for their particular ethnic group22. When 
the ethnic groups who supported Ralia Odinga felt they had won the election, and all the benefits 
it would bring, stolen from them by Kibaki’s ethnic bloc, they turned to violance23.  
The scholars Susanne Mueller24 and Mwangi Wa Gĩthĩnji25 exemplify the second view. 
They take Gutiérrez-Romero’s analysis further and find institutional failure caused the violence. 
These institutions were meant to channel citizens’ political frustrations into peaceful 
participation. Because these institutions failed or were non-existent, no institutional framework 
existed for the citizens to voice their feelings in a peaceful and meaningful way, and there was no 
trust that the institutions would then protect their interests if the other side won. Thus, the 
citizens’ frustrations spilled out into violence that manifested itself along ethnic lines, because 
political alliances in Kenya are often drawn along ethnic lines26. 
Both views point to a failure of the Institution Political, the overarching political 
superstructure that encompasses all areas of government politics. The ethnically-informed view 
supported by Gutiérrez-Romero points to a failure of institutions to treated all equally in the 
political sphere. This is not to say that ethnically-informed politics is illegitimate27, but that it 
manifests as a problem where there are ineffectual or no institutions at all. While politics may be 
about who gets what, when, and how, having it get to the point of zero-sum politics, where the 
winner takes all and the loser gets none, is a failure of representaive, democratic government. 
Mueller and Gĩthĩnji, obviously, point directly to institutional failure as the cause of the PEV. 
This institutional failure argument is connected to Lumumba’s constitutional failure 
argument. Without a constitutional basis or a respect for constitutionalism, the political elites’ 
self-interest ruled Kenya’s political system. This mentality traveled down to the general 
citizenry, manifesting itself along ethnic lines. These factors, along with others, came to head in 
2007, revealing the institutional weakness of Kenya’s previous Constitution. 
Citizen Political Participation in Kenya 
This institutional weakness also constrained citizen political participation. Karuti 
Kanyinga, in his report Democracy and Political Participation, finds the dominance of the 
executive and ethnically-informed politics constrained the citizens’ ability to meaningfully 
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participate, or participate at all, in the political arena28. The executive dominated the government, 
leaving no room for direct or representative participation; ethnically-informed politics pitted 
citizens against each other over political and economic incentives, delegitimizing the institutions 
by making political decisions be informed by ethnic loyalties, not for the good of the whole 
citizenry or country. 
A Reformational Constitution 
This is the political environment that prompted the creation of the new Constitution and it 
shows. In many ways this Constitution is a reformative constitution: it seeks to fix the 
institutions which failed in the past and reform the government to make sure the failures do not 
come about again.  
Kenya’s historical context and the previous constitutional failures informed the 2010 
Constitution. It mandates an extensive reformation of the executive, puts strict limits on its 
powers, and institutes strong checks between the branches of government29. It provides a strict 
code of ethics for elected officials30, to combat the culture of national cake politics. The new 
Constitution also makes citizen participation a national value and a principle of governance31, 
and involved citizen participation in nearly every part of the government, and provides for an 
extensive Bill of Rights32 for citizens. 
To make sure the Constitution will not fall prey to the fate of its predecessors, it provides 
a schedule of implementation33, which provides the legislation needed for implementation, when 
Parliament should pass this legislation, and what commissions the government should create to 
carry out some of its reformative mandates.  
Though a brief overview of Kenya’s political history34, this establishes the current 
Constitution’s context. The previous constitutions failed to provide the institutions necessary to 
run the country in a democratic and sustainable manner because, in part, of the dominance of the 
executive and the ethnically-informed, national cake politics. The new Constitution’s reformative 
character and focus on citizen participation come from Kenya’s turbulent history with 
constitutions and political participation. To understand why, and to what effect, this paper turns 
to the theory of Robert Dahl and Neo-Institutionalism.  
Robert Dahl, Neo-Institutionalism, and Kenya  
The new Constitution’s reformative efforts outlined above indicate a relationship between 
the Constitution, institutions, and citizen political participation. The Constitution’s efforts toward 
citizen political participation are suggestive of two strains of political theory: Robert Dahl’s 
Polyarchy and Neo-Institutionalist constitutionalism.  
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Robert Dahl in Polyarchy points to “the continuing responsiveness of the government to 
the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” as a main characteristic of 
democracy35. For this to be true, citizens must have the opportunity "to formulate their 
preferences", "to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government", and "to 
have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government"36. This paper focuses 
on the last opportunity, the act of direct participation by citizens in government.  
For this opportunity to exist in a nation-state, “the institutions of society must provide at 
least eight guarantees”37. These are the “freedom to form and join organizations”, the “freedom 
of expression”, the “right to vote”, the “right of political leaders to compete for support and 
votes”, access to “alternative sources of information”, “eligibility for public office”, “free and 
fair elections”, and “institutions for making government policies depend[ing] on votes and other 
expressions of preference”38. These are Institutional Guarantees: institutions in society necessary 
for citizens to have the opportunity to effectively participate in government39. 
 Dahl’s theory applies to the Kenyan context and Constitution because it takes a similar 
view on citizen political participation. It is not enough, for Dahl or the Constitution, for citizens 
to have the right to participate; they must also have the opportunity to, through institutions. For 
Dahl, these are institutions, not rights, that must be inclusively “openly available, publicly 
employed, and fully guaranteed”40. This means that most citizens should have access to these 
institutions, and they must also have the right to legitimate opposition to the government.  
The Constitution concurs with Dahl’s assessment. It both provides the right of 
participation and mandates that this participation must be effective in government decision 
making. Dahl’s theory helps explains why the Constitution might have made citizen political 
participation such a priority and why it mandates it should be a part of government decision 
making. Dahl’s theory does not, however, explain why the Constitution takes it upon itself to 
mandate how its mandates are to be implemented as institutions. 
Neo-Institutionalism 
 The Neo-Institutionalist school of constitutionalism41 from the 1990s. can explain this 
part of the Constitution. This school of though rose out of an interest to understand how 
constitutions create institutions that affect social life42. This body of literature takes a 
functionalist view of constitutions: a constitution’s function beyond its typical role as a 
foundational document, into the daily political life of citizens.  
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42 See W. W. Powell and P.J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1991) and Kent R. Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?: Government 
Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1993) for other examples of 
how constitutions create institutions that affect social life. 
 6 
This is important to this paper’s consideration because the Kenyan constitution is not just 
a foundational document, but a functional, reformational one as well. It seeks to make changes to 
the system and establish new institutions, rather than being a set of principles. This concept of 
constitutions is similar to Neo-Institutionalist literature. 
 The political scientist Giovanni Sartori43 contributes to this school of thought. While 
Sartori does not cover any new ground in constitutional study, confining himself to elections and 
formal government institutions like the legislature and executive, he creates an innovative way to 
view constitutions: as machines, with different parts that move together, that create institutions, 
which in turn deliver specific outcomes44, such as elections and procedures for politicians to 
govern the state45. Similar to Dahl’s required institutions, Sartori focuses more on the governing 
institutions, such as the legislature or executive, than the civil ones, like expression and 
organization. 
 The rapid regime changes around the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s might have 
influenced Sartori, as his stated impetus for his book was to propose, 
a legislative process for adverse conditions that neither allows parliamentary 
obstructionism nor, at the other extreme, the kind of government by decree to which 
Latin American presidentialism is dangerously prone46.  
Given this context, Sartori’s work is less a theoretical construct and more a blueprint for those 
evolving states, advising a very Western, liberal-informed view of what a government should be. 
However, this concept of a constitutional engine, one that creates institutions for specific 
outputs, fits with Dahl’s theory. 
 Sartori warns against ‘aspirational constitutions’, ones that seek to create institutions in a 
state beyond the purely functional, e.g. elections and the legislature47. He warns they will be “a 
deviation and an overload of constitutional capacities” that will prevent the constitution from 
functioning at all48. Sartori’s exclusive focus on elections and formal institutions is what 
Schmitter and Karl identify as the fallacy of electoralism49. They find holding elections and 
having formal democratic institutions are not enough to guarantee a democratic regime. It is a 
case all too common that countries will hold elections and elect leaders into office, having all the 
appearance of a democratic regime, and then manipulate them from behind the scenes, negating 
any actual power these institutions might have50. 
 Sartori’s relationship of constitutions and outputs prompted Jan-Erik Lane in 
Constitutions and Political Theory to examine what impact constitutions might have on political, 
social, and economic outcomes51. Lane finds the democratic institutions created by constitutions 
have no direct impact on those outcomes. He also finds Sartori’s outcomes model to be flawed52, 
                                                
43 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes 
(New York: New York University Press, 1994). 
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however, debatably this is an incorrect interpretation of Satori’s original argument53. According 
to Lane, a constitution’s true functional purpose, outside the formal political sphere, is protecting 
citizens’ human rights and freedoms54. 
 If we consider Sartori and Lane’s views on a constitution’s purpose in conjunction, the 
conclusion could be made that a constitution’s purpose becomes to create institutions that 1) 
ensure the stability and flourishing of the democratic state, and 2) regulate the relationship 
between the citizens and the state with regard to citizen rights and freedoms. This paper terms 
this functional constitutionalism.  
 As Robert Dahl shows, democratic regimes require institutions for citizen political 
participation. Therefore, this paper extends functional constitutionalism’s understanding of 
constitutional outcomes to citizen political participation. With this understanding of 
constitutions, Kenya’s new Constitution makes more sense. It creates institutions necessary for 
democratic governance, one of which is citizen political participation. Consequently, 
participation is not just a right in the Kenyan Constitution, but a necessary part of governing 
bodies. However, these institutions of citizen political participation in the Constitution do not 
automatically become reality. 
Issue of Implementation 
Lane’s work reflects this in his two definitions of a constitution: ‘written constitutions’ 
and ‘real regimes’55. The written constitution is “a compact document that comprises a number 
of articles about the State, laying down rules which State activities are suppose to follow”56, the 
laws of the land. The second definition, the ‘real regime’, is “the set of actually operating 
institutions that regulate state power and the relationship between government and citizens"57. 
These two definitions point out an important aspect of constitutionalism: just because the 
Constitution has democratic principles, does not mean there are democratic institutions in 
practice. Much like the fallacy of electoralism, this is the fallacy of constitutionalism.  
How a constitution moves from a ‘written constitution’ to a ‘real regime’ is the issue of 
implementation. As Lane argues, constitutions are only effective if they are successfully 
implemented, and become the rule of law58, for "it is one thing to devise a constitution but quite 
another matter to implement it"59. This is a weakness in Sartori’s constitutional engineering: 
implementation is a difficult process. The machine has output only if it is given power to do so. 
Much as a machine only has output when supplied with enough power, constitutions only 
operate effectively when fully implemented with enough power to be effective. 
Kenya Today 
This is where Kenya is at the moment. As stated by Ralia Odinga, then Prime Minister, in 
2010, “the task ahead is to implement the new Constitution of Kenya by making it a living 
                                                
53 Sartori never argues that constitutions have specific political, social, or economic outcomes in the book. What he 
does argue is that constitutions create strong institutions which allow for the stability and success of a democracy, 
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54 IBID, 211. 
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59 IBID, 198. 
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document and not a hollow script…our first task is to implement the Constitution”60. Odinga 
concurs with Lane’s point: a constitution has no power if it is not put into action. 
 This is the theoretical framework of constitutions and citizen political participation that 
this paper will use to understand Kenya’s new Constitution and its implementation. A 
constitution creates institutions that enable a democratic regime, one of which is citizen political 
participation, but the constitution must be implemented for it to have any impact.  
Methodology 
This paper measures the Constitution and constitutional implementation’s impact on 
citizen political participation by following Dahl’s Institutional Guarantees from de jure rights to 
de facto institutions in the Institution Political.  
 As discussed above, Robert Dahl established eight Institutional Guarantees required for 
citizens to have the opportunity to participate in government61. This paper uses these eight 
criterions to define and measure citizen political participation62. Dahl carefully notes these will 
not lead to “the development of public opposition"63. Rather, they are “conditions under which 
systems of public contestation are likely to develop and exist"64, i.e. institutions that allow 
citizens to develop a system of participation where they meaningfully participate in making and 
oppose government policies. utilization  
 Implementation is the process that moves citizen participation from a de jure right to a de 
facto institution of its own through three stages: rights, accessibility, and utilization, as shown in 
Figure 1. These Institutional Guarantees begin as provisions in the Constitution that give citizens 
the right to express their preferences within the Institution Political and make it have space for 
that expression. The second step of this process, how participation goes from a right to being 
utilized, is accessibility, where the government creates the institutions citizens require to 
participate in politics. They end as fully 
formed and utilized de facto institutions. This 
is where the citizens fully utilize their right to 
participate, are allowed to do so by the 
government, and are fully integrated and equal 
members of the Institution Political. This is the 
stage Dahl calls polyarchy, when a regime is 
fully inclusive and liberalized65. 
 This paper focuses on this process and understanding of how the Constitution creates 
institutions that, in turn, create and maintain spaces for citizens to participate and oppose 
government in a non-violent and sustainable way.  
 It first identifies how the Constitution provides for the Institutional Guarantees. Then it 
finds how the Constitution plans to implement them and how that implementation has gone 
                                                
60 Raila Odinga, "The New Constitution of Kenya: The Way Forward," (Nairobi: National Assembly, September 29, 
2010), 7. 
61 Dahl, Polyarchy, 2. 
62 This paper renames the last Institutional Guarantee to Responsive Institutions for brevity’s sake.  
63 Dahl, Polyarchy, 1. 
64 IBID, 10. 
65 IBID, 6. 
Rights Accessibility Utilization 
Figure 1: Implementation Process. 
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about, using reports from the commissions and independent bodies on the ground. Finding how 
well the citizens utilize these institutions is not within the scope of this paper. 
Analysis of Kenya’s New Constitution and Constitutional Implementation 
After substantial review of the data on Kenya’s citizen political participation under 
constitutional implementation against Dahl’s eight criterion, this paper concludes the 
Constitution and constitutional implementation positively impacted citizen political participation 
in the last five years. The Constitution protects citizen political participation rights and 
constitutional implementation improved citizen access to the right to vote, free and fair elections, 
and responsive institutions.  
Beyond identifying citizen political participation as a national value and principle of 
governance, the Constitution provides for all of Dahl’s institutional guarantees as citizen rights. 
For the most part, each of Dahl’s directly corresponds to a constitutional right. This paper takes a 
narrow view of constitutional rights through the lens of Dahl’s theory as interpreted above. 
However, some of the rights it identifies as addressing Dahl’s are a matter of interpretation.  
Rights 
1. Freedom to Form and Join Organizations 
The new Constitution guarantees citizens the right to form, join, and participate in any 
kind of association66, including political parties67 and cultural organizations68, in its Bill of 
Rights.  
The freedom of organization is practically unlimited outside of the political sphere. 
However, political parties cannot have a “religious, linguistic, racial, ethnic, gender or regional 
basis”69, so the cultural organizations must only be a part of civil society70. The Constitution 
reserves the right for the government to regulate political parties71. 
2. Freedom of Expression 
The Constitution provides for the citizen’s right of expression, both in the exchange of 
ideas72 and in public demonstration73. Like the right of organization, the Constitution limits this 
right from hate speech, which extends to multiple definitions74. Notably, it bans any speech that 
“constitutes ethnic incitement”75. These restrictions on speech and organization can be thought of 
as originating from the issues of political culture that Kenya faces. The restrictions might aim to 
remove the ethnically-informed character out of politics. 
3. Right to Vote 
                                                
66 Article 36(1). 
67 Article 38(1). 
68 Article 44(2). 
69 Article 91(2). 
70 Article 44(2). 
71 Article 91. 
72 Article 33(1). 
73 Article 37. 
74 Article 33(2). 
75 IBID. 
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The Constitution grants the right to vote, as well as to be registered as a voter, to every 
adult citizen. The citizen must be of sound mind and not been convicted of election-related 
crimes in five years76. 
4. Right of Political Leaders to Compete for Support and Votes 
The Constitution does not directly guarantee this right, but does place several restrictions 
on the character of a political party77 and on what a political party or candidate can say78.  
5. Alternative Sources of Information 
The Constitution mandates that all types of media are to be free and independent. Like 
the right of expression, the media is prohibited from saying anything which could be interpreted 
as hate speech or calls for violence, among others79. 
6. Eligibility for Public Office 
Each national public office carries some qualifications required to run for that office80, 
which extend beyond the usual age and citizenship requirements81. The Constitution also 
mandates descriptive representation for women, youth, those with disabilities, and minority 
groups82 through special seats in the Parliament and quotas83.  
7. Free and Fair Elections 
Citizens have the right to “free, fair and regular elections”, based on “the free expression 
of the will of the electors”84, with universal suffrage, for any public office. Further, an 
independent body should carry out the elections, not the government, ensuring they are “free 
from violence, intimidation, improper influence or corruption”, among other things85. Given that 
the failure of institutions during the 2007 election, leading to the PEV in part prompted the 
Constitution, it is possible this provision, along with the multitude of others relating to elections, 
comes from Kenya’s experience with questionable elections in 2007. 
8. Responsive Institutions 
The Constitution provides for this Institutional Guarantee in two ways. First, the 
Constitution calls for the people to elected governing institutions responsive to their will. One of 
the new Constitution’s major developments from the old is that it identifies the people as the 
source of sovereign power, not the state as the old Constitution did86. The Constitution envisions 
a state where all the governing institutions are responsive to the people. The members of the 
legislature and executive87 are elected by popular vote, and the members of the ministries are 
                                                
76 Article 38(3). 
77 Article 91(1). 
78 Article 91(2). 
79 Article 34(1). 
80 Article 137(1); Article 99(1-2). 
81 Article 75(1). 
82 Article 100. 
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85 Article 81. 
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nominated and confirmed by those elected 
bodies88. The people also have the right to 
petition Parliament89 and any other public 
authorities90. Policy decisions for public 
finance, among others, are to be made with 
public participation91, and public involvement 
is a value of public service92. 
The second way is through a major 
reformation of the government structure 
through devolution, see Figure 2. Devolution, 
the decentralizing the power from the central 
control in Nairobi to the newly created county 
governments93, has been a major part of 
constitutional implementation. In 2013, the 
government created 47 counties, new sub-
national units of government, each with their 
own elected governor, county executive, and 
county assembly94.  
Devolution attempts to make 
government institutions more local and give 
more self-governance to the people, away from 
the central power of the capital95. This involves 
an extensive transfer of functions96, which is on 
going. This paper place this under Responsive 
Institutions because it, among other things, 
makes governing institutions more local and 
responsive, and involves citizens more in 
government97. 
As shown in Figure 3, the Constitution 
liberally protects citizen rights to participation, 
coving all of Dahl’s Institutional Guarantees. 
This shows the Constitution provides citizens 
the de jure right of political participation 
completely. Next, this paper shows how 
                                                
88 Article 132(2). 
89 Article 119(1). 
90 Article 37. 
91 Article 201. 
92 Article 232(1). 
93 Article 174. 
94 Centre for Devolution Studies, Working Paper Series No. 1 (Nairobi: Centre for Devolution Studies and the 
World Bank, 2015), 2. 
95 Article 174. 
96 6th Schedule, Article 15. 
97 Article 174(c). 
Figure 3: Dahl's Institutional Guarantees and the 
Corresponding Constitutional Rights. 
Figure 2: Kenya’s Devolution, from World Bank, Devolution 
Without Disruption (Nairobi: World Bank, 2012), 14. 
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constitutional implementation made some of these rights accessible institutions for the public.  
Accessibility 
The Constitution guides its implementation through its 5th Schedule, which lays out the 
legislation Parliament must enact to implement the constitution, and the 6th schedule, which lays 
out the “Transitional and Consequential Provisions”98. This paper focuses on the 6th Schedule, 
which establishes the commissions in charge of taking the de jure constitutional provisions and 
implementing them into the society, making them into de facto institutions. Though the 
Constitution lays out a multitude of commissions all tasked with taking on different provisions, 
this paper looks at how constitutional implementation has made three of the Institutional 
Guarantees into accessible institutions. 
The first five years of constitutional implementation focused on making three of Dahl’s 
Institutional Guarantees into accessible institutions: the right to vote, free and fair elections, and 
responsive institutions. This paper defines accessibility as participation and opposition 
opportunities through institutions99.  
1. Right to Vote and Free and Fair Elections 
The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) covers both of these 
Institutional Guarantees. The Constitution created the IEBC to serve many functions, but for this 
paper’s purposes the important ones are “the continuous registration of citizens as voters” and 
“the facilitation of the observation, monitoring and evaluation of elections”100. In order to fulfill 
its Constitutional mandate, the IEBC crafted strategic priorities. Its main mission is "to conduct 
free and fair elections and to institutionalize sustainable electoral processes"101 by, amongst other 
things, "[increasing] registration of eligible voters", and "[enhancing the] efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Commission in the conduct of elections"102. 
On March 4th, 2013 Kenyans voted for president, deputy president, members of 
parliament, senators, and for the first time, county governors103. The first election since the 2007 
elections and the PEV, it was also the first national election under the new Constitution and a test 
of its ability to create stable, functioning democratic institutions. With 81% of registered voters 
turning out, a large increase from 2007 at 72%104, “no serious incidences of violence”, and 
declared free and fair by international observers105, it was, by most counts, a success.  
According to Freedom House, there were questions about the results, due to technical 
issues in the IEBC’s electronic system for counting votes and delays of ballot delivery106. 
However, the real sign of success was the increase of the number of voters. The number of 
                                                
98 Article 262. 
99 Developed from Dahl, Polyarchy, 235. 
100 Article 88(4). 
101 Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Annual Report 2011-2012 (Nairobi: Independent Electoral 
and Boundires Commission, 2013), 8. 
102 IEBC, Annual Report 2011-2012, 9. 
103 Mwangi S. Kimenyi, "Kenya: A Country Redeemed after a Peaceful Election," Brookings Institute, April 2, 
2013, accessed November 3, 2015. 
104 “The Online Data Analysis Tool,” Afrobarometer, accessed October 11, 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/online-
data-analysis/analyse-online. 
105 Kimenyi, "Kenya: A Country Redeemed after a Peaceful Election." 
106 “Freedom in the World: Kenya 2015,” Freedom House, accessed November 9, 20115. 
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people who could not find a polling station or were prevented from voting both fell from 1% to 
0%107. The number of people who felt the election was free and fair rose from 7% in 2007 to 
34%, and the number of people who thought it was free and fair but with minor problems also 
jumped from 14% to 27%, making the number of people who thought the election was mostly a 
positive result 61%108. The number of people who thought is was not free nor fair 
correspondingly fell from 42% to 18%109. The number of people who feared being a “victim of 
political intimidation or violence” a lot fell from 37% to 25%, and not at all rose from 17% to 
33%110. 
Mwangi S. Kimenyi of the Brookings Institute attributes “the prevailing peace in Kenya” 
to “the many reforms that the country has undertaken to create credible institutions like the 
IEBC”111. This is further evidenced by the management of the election challenge. Ralia Odinga, 
who won 43% of the vote, challenged the winners Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in court, 
claiming the IEBC had failed in its duty to conduct a free and fair election112. However, the 
Kenyan Supreme Court declared the election credible on March 31st113.  
Not only did the new institution deliver a free and fair election, but the greater Institution 
Political withstood a challenge to the election’s legitimacy. The fact that the elections were 
mostly peaceful and legitimate and did not result in violence is a major milestone is somewhat 
attributable to the work of the IEBC and constitutional implementation. 
2. Responsive Institutions 
 Devolution went formally underway after the 2013 elections when the Kenyan 
government established 47 counties, each with an elected governor, as sub-national units of 
government114. This paper uses the Kenya School of Government Center for Devolution Studies’ 
Working Paper Series on Devolution as its source on devolution.  
Devolution aims “to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the 
participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions 
affecting them”115. The Working Paper Series uses three metrics to measure “effective public 
engagement”, i.e. participation that actually impacts policy decisions: “Access to Information”, 
“Capacity Building and Civic Education”, and “Public Consultation”116. This paper focuses on 
the Public Consultation aspect of the new devolved units. This consultation would ideally occur 
through formal institutions of “structured engagements with the public” in the local 
governments117. 
The Working Paper Series found that, after a year on implementation, citizens were 
participating in their local governments, “though in unstructured arrangements by both County 
                                                




111 Kimenyi, "Kenya: A Country Redeemed after a Peaceful Election." 
112 IBID. 
113 IBID. 
114 Centre for Devolution Studies, Working Paper Series No. 1. 
115 Article 174(c). 
116 Centre for Devolution Studies, Working Paper Series No. 5 (Nairobi: Centre for Devolution Studies and the 
World Bank, 2015), 3. 
117 Centre for Devolution Studies, Working Paper Series No. 5, 3. 
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Executive and County 
Assembly”118. A table from the 
report, see Figure 4, shows that a 
majority, though not all, of the 
counties established institutions 
for citizen participation. 
Furthermore, the Ministry for 
Devolution and Planning found in 
2014 that 95% of counties 
involved public consultations in 
the budget, and 87.5% in 
integrated development 
planning119. While there were issues of citizens far away from the decision-making centers not 
being able to attend these meetings120, it is still positive progress. As the report states, “it is clear 
that the first year of devolution in Kenya has been one of setting structures and putting systems 
in place”121. 
The Years to Come 
From this evaluation, this paper claims the constitution and constitutional implementation 
positively impacted citizen political participation. It secured the rights to citizen political 
participation in the Constitution and seeks to make it a part of daily governance. Constitutional 
implementation led to a peaceful election, giving citizens the opportunity to vote and have a free 
and fair election, which they utilized. Constitutional implementation also established local units 
of government that are designed to be responsive to their citizens and create space to involve 
them.  
What will be important for the coming years is that the government and people continue 
to implement the constitution and make an effort to make citizen political participation an 
institution within the Institution Political and to encourage their citizens to utilize the spaces 
provided for them. 
This paper’s assessment is broadly optimistic about Kenya’s political situation. The 
Kenyan political reality is still a difficult one. Corruption is near universal, and considered a 
norm, if an unwanted one, by the public122. The rule of law is still weak123, and not all voices in 
Kenya are heard. However, the purpose of this paper is to show what the Constitution and 
constitutional implementation did for citizen political participation, with the hope these first 
steps by the Kenyan government and people will lead to a better democratic situation. 
 
                                                
118 IBID, 10. 
119 IBID. 
120 IBID. 
121 IBID, 13. 
122 “Freedom in the World: Kenya 2015.” 
123 IBID. 
Figure 2: Structures Established to Facilitate Citizen Participation, from Centre 
for Devolution Studies, Working Paper Series No. 5, 9. 
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